近几个月,中国的消费增长数据呈现快速、全面放缓的态势,尤其是大众消费增长亦显露疲态,可能从侧面反映出就业与居民收入增长承压。2018年下半年,整体可选消费增速下了一个台阶。其中,汽车销售对可选消费造成显著拖累——2018年乘用车销售首现量价齐跌;此外,中国的智能手机市场自2017年中起即开始收缩,这与本月初苹果公司下调其营收指引相呼应。但更值得警惕的是,大众消费品的增长也开始显现疲态,特别是部分具有“消费升级”意义的部分日常消费品,如瓶装水、肉制品、果汁饮料等。如果说可选消费与企业盈利的增长更为相关,那么大众消费增速承压,则更可能反映出就业形势与居民收入增长的变化。
多重负面因素叠加,造成近期消费减速。虽然其中部分因素有望逐渐消除,但是就业和收入增长的压力或将延续,并(在更广泛的意义上)对可选和大众消费均产生影响,成为今年消费增速变化的主要驱动因素。诚然,近几个月的消费减速由多重负面因素叠加造成,包括(1)就业形势的恶化(反映为真实失业率及居民收入增速承压)、(2)非住房消费贷显著收紧和(3)股市下跌带来的负财富效应。往前看,部分因素(例如消费贷收紧)对于消费的负面影响有望逐渐消除。但是,正如近期研报中所述,考虑到企业盈利状况恶化、地产的下行压力积聚、外需增长仍具不确定性、且新型服务业增速在向下换挡,因此,不排除今年多个行业就业承压的可能性。随着就业形势的恶化,消费增长存在进一步下行的风险,其中也包括具有“消费升级”意义的必选消费、大件消费品、服务消费、地产相关的消费等。此外,近期通缩压力快速上升,可能也将成为消费增长的掣肘,因为通缩预期上升会降低未来消费的“机会成本”、抑制当期消费需求,并且其对价格波动较大、周期属性相对明显的消费品类的抑制作用尤为明显。
往前看,投资者与政策制定者有必要密切关注企业盈利增速和亏损企业数量、亏损额的变动,这些指标能反映劳动力需求可能的走势和居民收入增速的变化,有助于判断今年总体消费的拐点。正如我们在之前报告中所分析的,虽然目前尚没有高质量、高频的数据用以评估短期的就业形势,但是居民收入增速的变化却通过其对消费需求的影响而与经济周期息息相关。企业盈利(以及从另一面而言,亏损企业数量和亏损额)能从侧面帮助我们了解居民收入增长的状况,因而将有助于判断今年总体消费的拐点。值得注意的是,工业企业盈利增速已于2018年11月转负,为2015年12月以来首次,表明消费减速、企业盈利恶化、居民收入增长放缓的“负反馈”正在逐步形成。往前看,我们预计工业企业利润同比增速继续下滑是大概率事件。虽然近期发改委提出了稳定消费需求的补贴计划,但是今年通过扩大财政支出来提振消费的空间可能有限——我们近期的分析已经表明,今年广义财政赤字扩张可能主要受中央及地方政府收入增速(被动)放缓推动、即财政收入所谓的“自动稳定器”效应,由此,即使只是保持政府支出平稳增长,所隐含的“资金缺口”意味着今年的“广义财政赤字”需同比大幅扩张2.5万亿元以上。
We have observed a pronounced and increasingly broad-based slowdown of consumption growth in recent months, including that of staples consumption. Such a phenomenon implies that employment and household income growth may be under pressure. Discretionary consumption growth took a big step down in 2H 2018. The most noteworthy drag to discretionary consumption was auto – both the price and volume of passenger car sales declined YoY in China for the first time ever in 2018; meanwhile, China’s smartphone market has been shrinking since around mid-2017, echoing Apple’s downward revision of revenue guidance earlier this month. More alarmingly, however, staples consumption growth also started to stall, particularly those consumer staples which cater to “consumption upgrading”, e.g., bottled water, meat products and fruit drinks. To the extent that discretionary consumption growth is more closely related to corporate profitability growth, the pressure on staples consumption growth clearly indicates changes in the employment situation and household income growth.
In our view, the recent deceleration of consumption growth results from the combined impact of multiple factors, some of which may gradually dissipate. However, the pressure of employment and household income growth may rise. Looking forward, changes in employment and household income growth may become the driving force of consumption, for discretionary and staples products alike. Granted, consumption deceleration in recent months was driven by a number of overlapping factors, including (i) a deteriorating labor market (i.e., heightened pressure on real unemployment rates and household income growth), (ii) the tightening of non-mortgage consumer loans, and (iii) the negative wealth effect from the sizeable correction of financial market valuation. Looking forward, some of these factors (e.g., consumer loan tightening) may dissipate. However, as we have analyzed in a recent note, we believe that the pressure of employment and household income will likely continue to unfold on many fronts this year, considering that corporate profitability is weakening, the property cycle is softening, external demand remains uncertain, and “modern” services industries are switching to slower growth. In light of a deteriorating labor market, further downside risk looms for consumption growth, including staples geared towards “consumption upgrading”, big-ticket items, services, and housing-related consumption. Even worse, rising deflationary expectations will further deter consumption growth, as deflationary impulse reduces the “opportunity cost” of delaying consumption, especially for items with more volatile and cyclical price movements.
Looking forward, investors and policy makers should closely monitor changes in corporate profitability growth, as well as the number of loss-making firms and the loss amount. These indicators may reflect labor market trends and changes in household income growth, and thus may be a useful gauge for consumption “turning point” this year. As we’ve analyzed, while there is no good-quality, high-frequency data that can be used to effectively evaluate short-term labor market conditions, changes in household income growth are closely tied to economic cycles through its impact on consumption and aggregate demand. Corporate profitability (and on the flip side, the number of loss-making firms and the loss amount) sheds light on the pace of household income growth, and therefore could be a useful gauge for consumption “turning point” this year. Importantly, industrial enterprise profit growth already turned negative in November 2018 for the first time since December 2015, indicating that the “negative feedback loop” between slowing consumption, deteriorating corporate profitability, and decelerating household income growth is potentially forming. Looking forward, it is not inconceivable that corporate profit growth may record a YoY contraction rate in the mid-teens this year. While the recent plan by the NDRC to stimulate consumption demand is a welcome move, the room for boosting consumption through fiscal expenditure growth may be limited – our analysis already showed that fiscal (deficit) expansion this year will largely be driven by the “automatic stabilizer” effect from the naturally slower government income growth, and that the broad-based fiscal “funding gap” would amount to more than Rmb2.5 trillion in order to just maintain the current pace of fiscal expenditure growth.